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In 
The ~upreme <9ourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
CALIFORNIA PACKING COR-
PORATION, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COJ\IMISSION OF 
UTAH and .JUANITA LEWIS 
.JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff has correctly stated the question which 
divides the parties to this proceeding, namely: 
Under the stipulated facts was the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah justified in using the fonnula 
D X 332 X .60 
----- or should it have used the formula 
52 
D X 300 X .60 
----- in arriving at weekly compensation~ 
52 
In plaintiff's brief it is contended that the word 
"usual'' as used in R. S. U. 1933, 41-1-70, as 
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2 
amended by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 193'1. during 
the year immediately preceding the injury result-
ing in death is equivalent to average weekly days 
per week. With that argument we take issue. 
Plaintiff has set out in its brief the statutes which 
are or may have a bearing on this controversy. We 
are apparently agreed as to the meaning of all of 
such statutes except 
Section 41-1-70, R. S. U. 1933, 
as amended by 
Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1937. 
wherein it is provided: 
"The average weekly wage of the injured 
person at the time of injury shall be taken 
as the basis upon which to compute bene-
fits. Employment shall mean pursuit in 
the usual trade, business or profession of 
the employer. Five and one-half or six 
days employment shall mean pursuit in the 
usual trade, business or profession, the 
usual operation of which is six days or less 
per week. Seven days shall mean pursuit 
in the usual trade, business or profession, 
the usual operation of which is seven days 
per week.'' 
We are agreed the daily wage of Mr. Johnson at 
the time of his fatal injury was Three and 80-100 
($3.80) Dollars. It is also agreed that Mr. Johnson 
was fatally injured in the course of his employ-
ment; that is, in the usual business operations of the 
plaintiff. We divide on whether under the stip-
ulated facts Mr. Johnson should be awarded com-
pensation on the basis of the usual operation of 
plaintiff's business at the time he was fatally in-
jured on six days or less per week, or on the basis 
of Revrn davs 11er 'veek. Plaintiff contends for the 
• l 
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forn1er - defendants for the latter. 'l'he word 
''usual" is defined in Webster's New International 
Dictionary as 1neaning ''such as occurs in ordinary 
practice or in the ordinary course of events; cus-
tomary, ordinary, habitual, common.'' 
It appears fron1 the stipulation that at the time 
Mr. Johnson was fatally injured and for forty days 
immediately preceding that time the plaintiff oper-
ated its business seven days per week and that dur-
ing the remainder of the year next preceding Mr. 
Johnson ~s fatal injury plaintiff's business was 
operated from five to six days per week. Thus the 
number of days per week that the plaintiff was 
operating had been increased about six weeks be-
fore the deceased received the injury resulting in 
his death either because the business of the plain-
tiff justified a longer week of operation, or because, 
as counsel for plaintiff contends, the business of 
the plaintiff was seasonal and the fatal injury 
occurred during the period when the operation of 
plaintiff's business was at its peak. 
In either event plaintiff's business, as the coin-
mission found and as the stipulation shows, was 
being carried on seven days per week when Mr. 
Johnson received the fatal injury. If plaintiff's 
business is seasonal in the sense that during somE: 
seasons of each year it is operated seven days per 
week~ it may not be said that there is anything un-
usual about the plaintiff's busine~s being operated 
seven days per week. In such case, on ihe contrar~ .. , 
the op0~ation iR us11a1 for that seacon of the year. 
Plaintiff's argument is based upon the premise that 
the average time that plaintiff did operate its busi-
ness during the year next preceding the date that 
.Johnson was fatally in~ured is of controlling im-
portance. There is no lang'l1age in the act wl1ich 
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indicates that the average days per week that a 
business operates during a year preceding an in-
jury should be used as the basis ·for determining 
what is the usual operation. The language used 
in the act nowhere indicates that average days per 
week during the preceding year shall constitute 
the basis for determining average weekly wage. As 
well say that the period of one month next preced-
ing the time in question shall be the basis for de-
termining what is the usual period of operation. 
Suppose a business operates seven days per week 
for only one month a year and is closed down during 
the remainder of t~e year. It could not be success-
fully contended that the usual period of operation 
of 'Such business is 4-52nds days per week and that 
compensation should be awarded on such basis. 
Also, if a business is operated only one week of 
seven days during a given year, it may not be suc-
cessfully maintained that a person who is injured 
or killed during that week shall be entitled to com-
pensation on the basis of 1-52nd of his actual weekly 
wage during that ~eek. To take another example: 
Suppose Mr. Johnson had been employed only a 
week or two before he was fatally injured. If 
plaintiff's contention is to prevail his compensation 
would not be fixed by the weekly wage that he 
actually received when injured but by the average 
number of days per week that the pJaintiff had 
been operating- its business during the preceding 
year. There is no language in the act which justi-
fies such conclusion. 
Obviously the dependents of Mr. Johnson should 
not and the law does not permit a reduction of the 
compensation to which they are entitled because he 
was employed for a long rather than a short period 
of time before he was injured. The law ~as taken 
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care of any controversy that n1ight otherwise arise 
by providing that the \yeekly wag·e shall he used as 
the basis and cOinpensation shall be detennined by 
the number of days that the business was operated 
during the week when the injury occurred. 
The clear expression of the legislature does not 
adinit of construction. There is no justification to 
change that language by a resort to the average 
weekly time that the plant operated during the year 
immediately precedin.g the time he was injured. As 
well take two or five years or one or six months. 
There was nothi"P-g unusual about the length of time 
that plaintiff's plant was op,erated during the week 
that Mr. Johnson was injured, but on the contrary 
the business was operated as usual for a period of 
seven days per week auring that week and for six 
week~ prior thereto. 
The case of 
~forrison-Merrill Co. v. Industrial Commis. 
sion, 81 Utah 363; 18 P. (2d) 295, 
lends support to fedendants' contention. 
rrhe award heretofore made by the defendant Indus-
trial Commission of Utah should be sustained with 
costs. 
Respectfully submitted. 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General of Utah. 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Attorney for Juanita Lewis 
Johnson. 
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